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Abstract: The article provides a brief overview of the
history of concordats, and explores the teaching of
Vatican Council II regarding Church-State relations.
In light of a rhetorical discussion of whether or not
Vatican Council II spelled the end of concordats as
such, the author analyses the texts of recent con-
cordats. Thereafter, the network of relations be-
tween Church and State are explored, setting out
the advantages and disadvantages of each, and
highlighting the model that affords the Catholic
Church most sovereignty. Finally, the role of Episco-
pal Conferences in Church-State relations is ad-
dressed, and the risk that national churches may
re-emerge is pointed out. 
Keywords: Religious freedom, Concordat, Church-
State relations, sovereignty of the Catholic Church.
Resumen: El artículo describe brevemente la histo-
ria de los concordatos y examina la enseñanza del
Concilio Vaticano II sobre las relaciones entre la Igle-
sia y el Estado. Tras responder a la cuestión retórica
acerca de si el Concilio es la tumba de los con-
cordatos, la autora analiza los textos concordatarios
más recientes. Seguidamente, el artículo afronta el
estudio del sistema de relaciones entre Iglesia y Es-
tado, subrayando defectos y ventajas de cada uno
de los sistemas y destacando que el modelo concor-
datario garantiza la soberanía de la Iglesia católica.
Finalmente, la Autora se refiere al papel de las con-
ferencias episcopales en las relaciones entre el Es-
tado y la Iglesia y apunta el riesgo de la reaparición
de las iglesias nacionales.
Palabras clave: Libertad religiosa, Concordato,
Relaciones Iglesia-Estado, Soberanía de la Iglesia
católica.
* Speech at the XVII Plenary Session of the he Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences-Universal
Rights in a World of Diversity. The Case of Religious Freedom-29 April-3 May 2011, Casina Pio IV.
Editor’s Note: The Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences was established by the Blessed
Pope John Paul II in 1994. The statutory aim of the Pontifical Academy is the promotion
of the studies and the progress of the social sciences, primarily economics, sociology, law
and political science in order to offer the Church the elements which she can use in the
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1. «HISTORIA CONCORDATORUM, HISTORIA DOLORUM»?
T his curial adage –with whom in the past Concordats were criticized asmutual concessions of privileges between Church and State– is still rel-evant today? Drawing on a question of a prominent member of the Ital-
ian Constituent Assembly, Giuseppe Dossetti (who was also a canon lawyer):
are Concordats a «bad deal for the Church»?
In order to answer, I would preliminarily clarify that Concordats are inter-
national treaties between two entities, the State and the Catholic Church, both
sovereign in their own domain respectively, the temporal and the spiritual one.
They are just tools, in themselves they are neither good nor bad. They become
good or bad depending on their contents.
It would be interesting to retrace the historical development of Concordats
in order to detect whether and how they have guaranteed freedom of religion in
its three aspects, institutional, collective and individual. We could start with an ini-
tial arrangement (basically a concordat) still under emperor Commodus in Roman
times, which allows a temporary cessation of persecution against Christians, to find
that it guarantees religious freedom as a minimum existential level: the freedom to
live as Christians. Or, for a formal agreement to ensure the libertas Ecclesiae, we
refer to the Concordat of Worms (1122), which in the Middle Ages ended the In-
vestiture Controversy, freeing the Church from the power of the Princes. It would
also be interesting to dwell on the concordats of the Age of Absolutism: they were
an equivocal alliance between Throne and Altar but allowed for a space (now small,
now large) of freedom that in a society based on privilege would not be otherwise
granted. Nevertheless it was a space surrounded by such caution and distrust that
represented a jurisdictionalist restriction both on the libertas Ecclesiae and on the
religious freedom of the subjects having a religion different from the Sovereign’s
one. Finally we consider the first non-confessional Concordat, the Napoleon’s
development of her social doctrine, and reflects on the application of that doctrine in con-
temporary society.
Actually there are 38 academicians, both catholic and non-catholic. Professor Fumagalli
Carulli was directly appointed in 2003 by John Paul II.
Each of the Academy’s Plenary Session begins with a report on the Church’s social teachings
and then investigates points where further elaboration of these teachings seems advisable and
provides a constructive evaluation of them in the light of the social sciences.
2011’s Plenary Session was dedicated to the principal contemporary challenges to religious free-
dom with a specific reference to the contribution of the Encyclical Pacem in Terris to this topic.
OMBRETTA FUMAGALLI CARULLI
439IUS CANONICUM / VOL. 51 / 2011
CONCORDATS AS INSTRUMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Concordat (1801). For the first time religious freedom was no longer linked to the
choice of the sovereign but to the choice of the people.
Being not possible to deepen these issues here, I would focus my thoughts
to the Twentieth Century and the beginning of our Century to highlight a par-
ticular trend: the purification of the concordat from «exchange of privileges» to
«pact of liberty».
Several factors lead to the passage from privilege to liberty.
Ex parte Status the spread of democratic regimes in once authoritarian States
creates the need to harmonize the previous Concordats with the new principles
of freedom. Let us consider, for example, the three most important and contro-
versial Concordats of the Twentieth Century with Western European countries:
the Concordats with Fascist Italy, with Nazi Reich and with Franco’s Spain. Con-
cordats were a protection against the spread of authoritarian –if not totalitarian–
regimes: they were not a full protection –of course– but still they were a protec-
tion. After the fall of illiberal regimes, the «pact of liberty» becomes the model
of Concordat which –made it so compatible with the confessional pluralism– is
inserted in the evolutionary process of pluralist democracy.
Ex parte Ecclesiae the «pact of liberty» is reached after an extraordinary event
in the rethinking of the relationship between Church and political community:
the Second Vatican Council. It is prepared by the Encyclical Pacem in Terris, the
watershed between ancient times and modern times. Aspects of Church’s con-
cordatarian policy post-Vatican II show a great capacity of the Catholic Church
to become a standard-bearer for freedom. Let’s look at them.
2. THE II: TOMB OF CONCORDATS?
A question was heavily debated immediately after the Council: did the
Council Fathers intend to bury the Concordats? The answer is no. But we
need to qualify this statement.
First, the Council does not express itself in technical legal terms. The
Council does not use the term Concordat but the reference to the cooperatio
on one hand and, secondly, the claim that «the Church and the political com-
munity in their own fields are autonomous and independent from each other»
(Gaudium et Spes, n. 76) are arguments in favour of the concordatarian system.
The dialogue between Church and State will be more fruitful to the extent
that it will respect the equal dignity, even in legal terms, of the parties. The
Concordat –as legal act between two entities that mutually recognize the each
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other’s sovereignity in their respective domain and that are both designed
to serve the human person– allows to reach an agreement which is the fruit
of the cooperation rather than the result of an act of supremacy. Let’s con-
sider the Italian example. During the Fascist Age, in 1929, the Concordat
provides important –albeit limited– areas of freedom for the Church and
for the individual which would otherwise not exist, and the two entities,
Church and State, seem jealous of their own sovereignty. During the dem-
ocratic age, in 1984, the Concordat is a tool of «mutual cooperation in the
interest of the person and for the good of the country». It goes from a static
position of actio finium regundorum to the dynamic perspective to be serving
the common good. The 1993 Concordat with Poland express itself in sim-
ilar terms1.
The second point concerns a discontinuity of the Council with the
past. Gaudium et Spes, n. 76, states that the Church «does not place her trust
in the privileges offered by civil authority. She will even give up the exercise
of certain rights which have been legitimately acquired, if it becomes clear
that their use will cast doubt on the sincerity of her witness or that new
ways of life demand new methods». So the privileges are to be abandoned,
not the Concordats.
A third novelty of the post conciliar Concordats regards freedom of
the person and of his/her choices. The conciliar Declaration Dignitatis Hu-
manae continues a turning point in a direction already indicated by Pacem
in Terris. John XXIII (in discontinuity with the Syllabus of Pius IX) had al-
ready invited to distinguish between error and the person who errs. Ac-
cordingly Dignitatis Humanae provides for religious freedom as a
fundamental right benefiting also «those who do not live up to their obli-
gation of seeking the truth and adhering to it», in the belief that «the truth
cannot impose itself except by virtue of its own truth».
Hence further developments in various post-conciliar Concordats such
as the need to ensure the freedom of religious choice. An example from the
1984 Agreement with Italy: it is guaranteed the right to attend to Catholic
1 «The Republic of Poland and the Holy See reaffirm that the State and the Catholic Church
are, each in its own domain, independent and autonomous, and that they are fully committed
to respecting this principle in all their mutual relations and in co-operating for the promotion
of the benefit of humanity and the good of the community».
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religious teaching in public schools as well as it is guaranteed the right to
not attend to such teaching. Hence the tendency to avoid preferential legal
regime for Catholics, since a differential treatment could have detrimental
consequences for non-Catholics.
Finally, the facts also prove that the post-conciliar Church does not
consider the Concordats’ season closed. After the Vatican II not only there
was a review of existing Concordats to adapt them to the Council’s teaching,
but also several others have been signed, even with officially or sociologi-
cally non-Catholic Countries. Let’s consider the Agreement with Israel or
the one with Kazakhstan. This shows that the Concordat will continue to
be a tool for a sana cooperatio2.
3. TODAY’S SYSTEMS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE
In order to better assess the characteristics of the Concordats let me
broaden now the horizon to the various systems of relations between Church
and political community (which usually is the nation-State but which can be
another articulation in federal systems, such as the Land in Germany).
They mirror and reflect the historical, cultural and legal traditions
of each country. They are essentially referable to three models: a) the sep-
aratist model, b) the Church of State’s model; c) the concordatarian model.
Before evaluating each of them not so much in the abstractness of the
theory but in the concreteness of the present reality, I would point out that
freedom of religion can be protected in each of the three models. The im-
position of a single model –as someone would whish in the case of the Eu-
ropean Union– would violate the principle of subsidiarity, which gives to
each political community a margin of appreciation in choosing how to reg-
ulate their relations with religious denominations and how to guarantee its
citizens religious freedom.
2 Another criticism of the Concordats is based on the assertion that the relationship between
Church and State after the Council can no longer be classified as a relationship between two
legal systems, but between two communities of men. The teaching of Paul VI already denied
this claim in 1969, so soon after the ending of the Vatican II. His Motu Proprio Sollicitudo Om-
nium Ecclesiarum states that State and Church «both are perfect societies, endowed therefore with
their own means, and are autonomous in their respective spheres of activity». Moreover, reasserting
the aims of the dialogue between Church and States, it consider them more easily accessible
if there is an official legal relationship, such as the concordatarian practice.
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3.1. The separatist model
The separatist model have as most famous archetypes France and
USA: separatism «hostile to religion» the first one, «friend of religion» the
second. This distinction was valid at the beginning of the Twentieth Cen-
tury when the echoes of the Enlightenment in France and of the French
Revolution was not yet extinguished, while in America was still strong the
reference to the Founding Fathers. Recently there has been a mitigation of
French separatism (at least in the words of President Sarkozy), and has in-
creased U.S. separatism (some judgments of the Supreme Court have em-
phasized the role of the so-called wall of separation) in the sense opposite
to that outlined by Alexis de Tocqueville in his famous essay «Democracy
in America».
Separatism is characterized by the fact that the State shall refrain
from adopting measures in support of religious denominations (e.g., public
funding), offering as a pendant a commitment not to interfere in the activity
of such denominations. It is a model in itself not contrary to religious free-
dom but which raises three concerns.
First, the lack of state support to religious phenomena can lead to un-
equal treatment: the choice not to fund religious denominations is not ex-
pressing neutrality in front of the religious phenomenon but a favourable
attitude toward non-religion. Second, separatism often appears as «free
Church in a free State». Expression well known to the Italians, having been
coined by Cavour. Expression seductive but misleading. Because «in» ac-
tually means that the Church is not recognized by the State as primary and
original legal order (it is not said «free Church and a free State»), but as a
secondary legal order, therefore subject to State’s sovereignty.
The promise, therefore, not to interfere in the activity of the Church
can remain a dead letter. Finally –and it is perhaps the most important as-
pect– separatism imposes incommunicativeness between State law and re-
ligious legal order. Except that we all know that if there are matters purely
spiritual (the sacraments) and purely temporal matters (the sword, the scale
and the currency), there are also different res mixtae. Let us consider, for
example, cultural heritage of religious interest belonging to ecclesiastical
structures: incommunicativeness between the two legal systems makes it
difficult for a regulation satisfactory for the one or for the other, being the
result of a unilateral decision.
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3.2. The Church of State’s model
The Church of State’s model (confessionalism) is even more varied than
the separatist one. It is present in very different contexts: in several Orthodox
and Protestant Countries, just to mention Christian contexts. But even Israel
and many Islamic States adopt it.
It is possible to identify a common denominator: the non-existence (or at
least the weakening) of the distinction between temporal and spiritual power. This
in two ways: or that the head of state is also the head of the National Church (think
of the Queen of England), or that religious leaders have a role of government. In
this second sense it is emblematic the case of Iran. Also the Dalai Lama asserted
political, as well as spiritual, leadership of Tibet, which he waived very recently.
The general objection to such a model is that it denies the principle of the
duality of the mankind’s government, embodied in the Gospel precept «repay
to Caesar what belongs to Caesar and to God what belongs to God». On a more
practical plan the Church of State’s model can produce violations of religious
freedom not only of the members of other denominations, but also of the free-
dom of Church of State. The Church of Norway, for example, is subject in all
respects to the legislation of the National Parliament (Storting) that in June 2008
legalized same-sex union. As a result, the National Church was expected to en-
dorse these unions and was called upon to reform the liturgy in order to comply
with new legislation. Violation of institutional religious freedom is obvious: a rel-
evant decision –even from the doctrinal point of view– is not taken by the reli-
gious authorities (the Synod), but by the political power3.
3.3. The concordatarian model
The concordatarian model entails a bilateral negotiation between
Church and political community which is respectful of their reciprocal auton-
omy. In democratic Countries the dialogue with the Church meets a partici-
patory conception which nourishes freedoms. We have already mentioned it
3 On the other hand in Greece it was in force until Nineties a legislation (later abrogated fol-
lowing up the European Court of Human Rights’s judgment Manoussakis v. Greece) according
which the building of place of worship of religious denominations different than the Greek-
Orthodox one was subject to authorization of the local Orthodox Metropolitan. It is appre-
ciable the intent to keep the historical and religious tradition of the Country but we cannot
help to report the consequent violation of the religious freedom.
CONCORDATS AS INSTRUMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING FREEDOM OF RELIGION
444 IUS CANONICUM / VOL. 51 / 2011
OMBRETTA FUMAGALLI CARULLI
above referring to the Italian situation. It should be added here that the strong
concordatarian tradition in Italy was driving for the freedom of other denom-
inations. Our founding fathers have in fact introduced a new legal institution,
the Intesa (agreement) with non-Catholic denominations, which allowed them
to protect their own identity through negotiation with the Government. The
difference in treatment derives from the fact that Catholic Church has legal
personality under international public law and may therefore conclude an in-
ternational treaty (the Concordat), while other denominations –without in-
ternational legal personality– enter into an agreement under domestic public
law. This principle of bilateralism was reflected in 1997 by the democratic
Constitution of Poland which looked at the Italian example as a model.
If the concordatarian model is not in itself immune from criticism (es-
pecially when used as an instrument of privilege to the detriment of members
of other religious denominations), nevertheless it has at least two aspects that
make it preferable to other models: 1) it implies the recognition by the State
of the Church’s sovereignty (whose implications we will examine shortly) and
thus the distinction between temporal and the spiritual sphere; 2) the regula-
tion of res mixtae is the result of bilateral negotiations and is not one-sided.
Where possible, Catholic Church has entered into Concordats (or, be-
yond the nomen iuris, similar international treaties) to adjust its relations with
the States. To date, the Holy See has diplomatic relations with 178 States and
42 of them have signed a concordatarian agreement.
4. THE ISSUE OF THE SOVEREIGNTY
The fact that the concordatarian system presupposes and confirms the sov-
ereignty of the Catholic Church is not a merely decorative or ceremonial issue.
It relates to fundamental aspects, first of all the Holy See’s claim of legal person-
ality and capacity under international law. If the legal doctrine differs in providing
the theoretical justification for such principle (there are those who argue that it
would be a dogma of faith), an empirical overview of this issue (an approach that
characterizes international public law) leads to recognize her legal personality
and capacity. In fact the Holy See historically participates in international rela-
tions, meeting the criterion requested under international law for external sov-
ereignty: the existence de facto as a centre of will and independent action. Among
the most significant contributions, I would recall that the Holy See has partici-
pated in the work of drafting of the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic relations
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and on international treaties and then became a party of them. Similarly in 1972,
when the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was convened,
she was considered a participating State, without any dispute on her sovereignty.
Two issues need to be mentioned. The first concerns the fact that the
Holy See’s international sovereignty is independent from the temporal power
on the State of Vatican City. After debellatio of Papal States, from 1870 to 1929
the Holy See continued to exercise active and passive rights of legation and
to conclude Concordats. It is a demonstration of the spiritual –not temporal–
nature of her international sovereignty, recognized by the ius gentium. The
second question is closely linked to this special nature: the Holy See –self-
limiting her sovereignty (Article 24 of the Lateran Treaty)– declares herself
«not involved in international disputes between the States and in international
conferences organized for that purpose». Therefore she no longer intends to
deal with purely political or military disputes.
Even so limited, the international sovereignty of the Holy See is victim of
a propaganda campaign aimed at excluding her from International Organizations
and at denying the Concordats’ nature as international treaties. These lobbies
are extremely dangerous not so much, or just because, they are intended to de-
prive the Church of a right essential for the exercise in the World of her priestly,
prophetic and royal office, but also because, limiting her sovereignty, surrepti-
tiously seek to impose on the Church rules conflicting with her religious beliefs.
Unlike in the past, when it the freedom of episcopal appointments
which was at stake, today the neo-jurisdictional attack is more subtle but no
less dangerous. Denying the sovereignty of the Church means, in this context,
opening the way for the application of State law even within the Catholic
Church itself. The European Parliament has already adopted a resolution con-
trary to religious denominations that do not allow women access to positions
of government. It is expected that soon another resolution will object to the
Church ban against same-sex marriage under Canon law.
From this point of view Concordats have crucial importance. In addition
to reaffirming the sovereignty of the Holy See they are an important bulwark to
ensure that State’s legislation does not affect the very nature of the Catholic
Church. Such an important legal bulwark that there are several attempts to attack
it indirectly. Supranational bodies (I refer in particular to the European Court of
Human Rights and to the EU Institutions) –being unable to directly challenge
the contents of the Concordats– contest them indirectly. These bodies claim that
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the State Party, while giving execution to Concordats, introduces into domestic
law a legislation which is not in line with international standards. It follows an
invitation to the States, more or less explicit, to denounce the Concordat.
The ultimate goal of these manoeuvres is to exclude religion from public
life. Eliminating in fact any autonomy and individuality of religious commu-
nities and subjecting them to the laws of the State becomes instrumental to
the assimilation of religious choice to the choice to join charitable or sporting
association. In essence, it means removing the public role of religion relegating
it to a purely private fact.
5. THE CONCORDATS AND THE NATIONAL EPISCOPATE
In conclusion, I mention an issue which, although specific, has conse-
quences of a general nature: the role of the national bishops’ conferences.
After the Council, there were those who put into question the role of the Holy
See in its relations with States, and tried to exclude any jurisdiction of the
apostolic nuncio in favour of the conferences of bishop.
Although more nuanced than previously, the current Canon Law4 con-
tinues to give to the Holy See (Sectio altera of the Secretariat of State) and to
the apostolic nuncio the authority to entertain relations with the States and
gives to the first the power to enter into Concordats. In some Concordats
there is a mediation: they defer to subconcordatarian agreements between the
State and the episcopal conference the establishment of practical implemen-
tation of general principles set out in the Concordat.
I do not want to address the issue of the relationship between the Holy
See and the conferences of bishops from a theological and pastoral point of
view. From a legal point of view I note that a further expansion of this practice
runs the risk of leading to the emergence of national churches. History shows
how the national conferences of bishops have sometimes come to terms with
unjust governments. Our French colleagues, but not only them, will certainly
remember the 1682 Declaration of the Gallican Clergy with its infamous four
articles: a black page of subservience of the episcopacy to the absolute King.
To avoid similar temptations, the universal authority of the Holy See
seems the best guarantee of freedom.
4 Motu Proprio Sollicitudo Omnium Ecclesiarum, can. 365 Code of Canon Law and article 46 of
the Constitution Pastor Bonus.
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